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PRECAP: State v. Spady; The 24/7 Sobriety Program Might Work, 




No. DA 14–0089 
Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Monday, April 27, 2015 at 9:30 AM in the Strand Union 
Building, Ballroom A on the campus of Montana State University, 
Bozeman, Montana. 
 
I. QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
Is the Montana 24/7 Sobriety Program 1) void for vagueness; 2) 
an improper delegation of legislative power; 3) a pretrial punishment; 
and 4) an improper search and seizure? 
 
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 
 
In 2011, the Montana Legislature adopted the Montana 24/7 
Sobriety Program Act (“24/7 Sobriety Program”), which gives Montana 
courts the authority to “condition any bond or pretrial release for an 
individual charged with a second or subsequent violation of 61–8–401 or 
61–8–406 [driving under the influence (“DUI”)] upon participation in the 
sobriety program and payment of fees required by 44–4–1204.”2 The 
24/7 Sobriety Program requires a court-ordered participant to appear 
twice daily in 12-hour intervals to perform a $2 alcohol breath test. The 
24/7 Sobriety Program is administered by the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”). The DOJ sets the costs for each test and determines the criteria 
for the testing and procedures used. A violation of the court’s order to 
participate in the 24/7 Sobriety Program results in a misdemeanor charge 
of criminal contempt.  
On April 20, 2013, Robert Earl Spady (“Spady”) was arrested 
and charged with misdemeanor careless driving and misdemeanor DUI. 
Spady had a prior DUI conviction from 2006–2007. On April 21, 2013, 
Spady pled not guilty was released on bail. As a condition of his release, 
Spady was ordered, among other things, to: 1) not consume alcohol; and 
2) participate in the 24/7 Sobriety Program. Through April and May of 
2013, Spady did not appear or was late for three of his breath tests. 
                                           
1 Factual and procedural background, unless specifically cited, is drawn from two documents: 1) Br. 
of Appellant, June 19, 2014, No. DA 14–0089; and 2) Br. of Appellee, Oct. 20, 2014, No. DA 14–
0089.  
2 Br. of Appellant 24. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 44–4–1305(3) (2013)).  
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Spady was charged with three counts of criminal contempt for his failure 
to appear for testing.  
Spady pled not guilty to the charges of criminal contempt and 
moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the 24/7 Sobriety Program 
violated various constitutional protections. The justice court denied the 
motion. On September 23, 2013, Spady and the State entered a plea 
agreement. Spady pled nolo contedere to the criminal contempt charges 
and the State dismissed the DUI and careless driving charges. Spady 
specifically reserved the right to appeal the justice court’s denial of his 
motion to dismiss the criminal contempt charges. 
On appeal, the district court reversed the justice court and found 
the 24/7 Sobriety Program was 1) void for vagueness, 2) an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, and 3) an 
unconstitutional pretrial punishment in violation of due process. The 
district court refused to reach the issue of whether the 24/7 Sobriety 
Program implicated the Fourth Amendment. The State appealed. 
The State’s brief raised several procedural issues3 and in 
response, the Court, “in light of the procedural circumstances of this 
case,” exercised sua sponte supervisory control and requested briefing 
from both parties specifically on: 1) the constitutional issues the district 
court raised in declaring the 24/7 Sobriety Program unconstitutional; and 
2) the 24/7 Sobriety Program’s 4th Amendment search and seizure 
implications.4 Due to the Court’s unusual decision to grant sua sponte 
supervisory control, this article will focus largely on the two specific 






                                           
3 The State argues that procedural issues should decide this case and has continued to raise those 
issues in supplemental briefing. Procedurally, the State has two primary arguments. First, the 
collateral bar rule applies. Spady did not challenge the 24/7 Sobriety Program under his DUI charge, 
but rather in the contempt proceedings, which is an “improper collateral attack.” Second, the district 
court did not have authority to decide issues not properly before it. Spady entered a nolo contendere 
plea to his DUI/careless driving charges in justice court and only reserved his right to appeal the 
justice court’s decision on his motion to dismiss. On appeal, however, Spady raised two new 
constitutional issues: 1) improper delegation; and 2) unconstitutional search and seizure. As such, 
those two additional claims ought not be heard because they were not properly before the district 
court. 
 
Spady responds that the State waived its collateral bar argument because it did not raise this 
argument before the justice or district courts. Further, Spady argues that the State agreed to an appeal 
of the instant issues in the Spady’s plea agreement.  The plea agreement acknowledged Spady’s right 
to appeal the motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds. The order in question specifically referred 
to the defense’s arguments regarding excessive bail, the defendant’s right to privacy, and due 
process violations. Finally, even if the collateral bar rule does apply, Montana has not followed the 
federal rule and should decline to do so. 
4 Order 1, Feb. 19, 2015, No. DA 14–0089. 





A. Constitutional Issues Raised by the District Court 
 
The district court raised three specific constitutional issues with 
the 24/7 Sobriety Program: 1) it is void for vagueness; 2) the program 
impermissibly delegates legislative authority; and 3) it is a pretrial 




The district court held that the 24/7 Sobriety Program was vague 
because it was unclear whether “second or subsequent violation” 
includes convictions outside the five-year look-back period as noted in 




The State contends the 24/7 Sobriety Program is neither vague 
facially or as applied to Spady. To be facially vague, a statute must 
provide no standard of conduct and be impermissibly vague in all its 
applications.6 The district court noted some instances where the statute 
would be vague (when an arrestee has a prior DUI charge), not that it 
was vague in every instance.7 Therefore, a ruling that it is facially vague 
is improper. Second, the State argues the statute is not vague as applied 
to Spady because the plain reading of the code (applies to “persons 
‘charged with a second or subsequent violation’ of the DUI laws”) has no 
dates or periods of time and therefore clearly means their entire lifetime, 
not whether their prior DUI charges were convictions under the 
sentencing statutes, which, the State argues, is a “highly legalistic (and 
incorrect) reading.”8  
Spady agrees with the district court’s findings and notes statutes 
are considered vague and, therefore, void, when they “fail to give 
sufficient notice of what is prohibited.”9 The statute does not clarify how 
it interacts with the DUI sentencing statutes which determine the number 
of prior DUI convictions for purposes of sentencing: a defendant cannot 
know if he would fit into the 24/7 Sobriety Program requirements 
                                           
5 Appellee’s Supp. Br. 11, Mar. 23, 2015, No. DA 14–0089 (the conviction statute is MONT. CODE. 
ANN. § 61–8–734). 
6 Appellant’s Supp. Br. 2–3, Mar. 23, 2015, No. DA 14–0089 (citing State v. Watters, 208 P.3d 408, 
470 (Mont. 2009)). 
7Id. at 3–4. 
8Id. at 5. 
9 Appellee’s Supp. Br. 10. 
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depending how long ago his prior DUI conviction had been.10 The statute 
could mean lifetime DUIs or it could be just those DUIs included in the 




To be void for vagueness, a statute must not give ordinary people 
enough information to understand what is prohibited.11 On its face, it 
seems clear that the 24/7 Sobriety Statute applies to individuals charged 
with a “second or subsequent” DUI conviction, regardless of the 
lookback period.12 The provision reads in full: 
 
Upon an offender's participation in the sobriety program 
and payment of the fees required by 44–4–1204: 
 
(a) the court may condition any bond or pretrial release 
for an individual charged with a violation of 61-8-465, a 
second or subsequent violation of 61-8-401 or 61-8-406, 
or a second or subsequent violation of any other statute 
that imposes a jail penalty of 6 months or more if the 
abuse of alcohol or dangerous drugs was a contributing 
factor in the commission of the crime.13 
 
The State’s argument that the lookback provisions apply only to 
sentencing is persuasive. The 24/7 Sobriety Program and actual 
sentencing upon conviction for a DUI are two separate code sections and 
used at two different timeframes. One is used prior to conviction and the 
other is upon conviction when deciding a convict’s sentence. The statute 
clearly notes it applies upon “any bond or pretrial release” —not 
sentencing—and therefore would seem to give an ordinary person notice 
of its applicability.  
 
2. Legislative Delegation 
 
The district court held that the Montana Legislature’s delegation 
of authority to the DOJ was impermissible because it did not provide 
criteria for what “reasonable” meant when the DOJ set the 24/7 Sobriety 
Program’s fees.14 
 
                                           
10 Id. at 11–12. 
11 State v. Knudson, 174 P.3d 469, 472 (Mont. 2007).  
12 In 2013, the Montana Legislature amended MONT. CODE. ANN. § 44–4–1205 and moved (3) to 
(2)(a).  
13 MONT. CODE ANN. § 44–4–1205(2)(a) (2013) (emphasis added). 
14 Appellee’s Supp. Br. 12. 







The State argues the delegation was not without guidance 
because the DOJ was instructed to establish a “reasonable” fee, which 
includes the “fees to pay the cost of installation, monitoring, and 
deactivation of any testing device.”15 The costs are linked to the cost to 
administer the program. In 2013, just after Spady was arrested, the 
Montana Legislature enacted further guidelines noting the program had 
to “best facilitate[] the ability to apply immediate sanctions for 
noncompliance at an affordable cost.”16 The State argues this provides 
enough guidance. The “reasonable” language is not an arbitrary grant of 
power to the DOJ.  
Spady counters that the district court was correct because Spady 
was charged under the 2011 law, which did not have the additional 
language requiring it to be “affordable.” Further, the DOJ could choose 
any fee structure it felt was “reasonable” because the statute does not 
require that the fees be limited only to the costs of administering the 
program.17 Therefore, the DOJ has unfettered, arbitrary power to decide 




Legislative delegations must “prescribe a policy, standard, or 
rule for their guidance and must not vest them with an arbitrary and 
uncontrolled discretion with regard thereto, and a statute or ordinance 
which is deficient in this respect is invalid.”18 The Montana Supreme 
Court has determined that “worthwhile” and “based upon the effects” 
were impermissible delegations of authority because there was no 
associated criteria for evaluating what they actually meant.19 It is not 
perfectly clear that “reasonable” would fit into the “worthwhile” 
category. First, there were some criteria given to the DOJ in the 2011 
version of the statute. The fees had to include, reasonably, the various 
costs of the program. The DOJ could add up the costs to run the program 
and determine what it cost, per test, to operate. This would be a 
“reasonable” fee structure and one that is not arbitrary and solely within 
the DOJ’s control and one that the Legislature could verify. On the other 
                                           
15 Appellant’s Supp. Br. 10–11. 
16 Id. at 7. 
17 Appellee’s Supp. Br. 12–14. 
18 Williams v. Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs of Missoula Cnty., 308 P.3d 88, 97 (Mont. 2013) 
19 Appellee’s Supp. Br. 13 (citing In re Authority to Conduct Savings & Loan Activities, 597 P.2d 84 
(Mont. 1979); In re Petition to Transfer Territory from High School Dist. No. 6, 15 P.3d 447 (Mont. 
2000)); Reply Br. of Appellant 17. 
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hand, there was no limiting language on “reasonable” itself requiring it to 
be, for instance, a percentage of a monthly budget for someone at the 
poverty line, or, as Spady noted, limiting the fees to only the costs of the 
program. In the end, the “reasonable” standard for running the program 
should be enough to not constitute an arbitrary delegation. If one were to 
examine the program and find, for example, costs for things not needed 
to administer the program, then it would not be reasonable. One could 
also examine the aspects of the program and determine if some parts 
being charged for were or were not reasonable. The Court will likely find 
there is enough guidance present for the 24/7 Sobriety Program to not 
constitute an improper legislative delegation.   
 
3. Pretrial Punishment & Due Process 
 
The district court concluded that $2 fee per breath test 
constituted a pretrial punishment of an arrestee who is presumed 




The State counters that while it is a violation of due process to 
punish a person before they are convicted, not all restrictions on liberty 
or deprivations of liberty are punitive. Citing Bell v. Wolfish,20 the State 
argues the presumption of innocence doctrine does not apply to a 
determination of the due process rights of a pretrial detainee.21 As such, 
conditions on an arrestee’s bond are valid if they serve to protect the 
victim or community, or prevent recidivism.22 The State may charge a 
reasonable fee for administering the bail system and it is not considered 
punitive to have probationers pay the costs of the programs the court 
deems they should participate in. The $2 fee for the 24/7 Sobriety 
Program tests are in the same vein: they are not imposed for punishment 
and are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. Further, the program 
ensures the community is kept safe and is a minimal cost for ensuring 
such safety. 23   
Spady counters that when a statute has been historically used as 
a punishment or when its costs are excessive compared to its non-
punitive purposes, then it is penal, not regulatory. Since its inception, the 
24/7 Sobriety Program has been applied to both pretrial defendants and 
those convicted of a second or subsequent DUI. The program has been 
considered a punishment since its inception and therefore is a pretrial 
punishment. Further, the $2 fees charged while a defendant is awaiting 
                                           
20 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
21 Appellant’s Supp. Br. 13. 
22 Id. at 12–13. 
23 Id. at 14–15. 
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trial are not refundable—even if the detainee is deemed innocent—and is 




As enacted, the 24/7 Sobriety Program applied to both pretrial 
defendants charged with a second or subsequent DUI and those who 
have been convicted of the same offense. It is difficult to classify the 
program as “historically” punitive since it applies to pretrial detainees as 
well as convicted offenders and both were enacted simultaneously. The 
Legislature was quite clear: “[t]he Legislature further declares that the 
purpose of this part is: (a) to protect the public health and welfare by 
reducing the number of people on Montana's highways who drive under 
the influence of alcohol or dangerous drugs.”25 While it is used as a 
punishment after conviction, it still serves the primary purpose of 
preventing drunk driving and protecting the public welfare in both 
situations. The real question is whether the $2 fee per test, not the test 
itself as a condition of bail, is a pretrial punishment and therefore a 
violation of the Due Process Clause. Citing Bell v. Wolfish, the State 
argues if a “condition or restriction” of pretrial detention is reasonably 
related to a legitimate government interest, it passes constitutional 
muster.26 Necessarily, if the 24/7 Sobriety Program is 1) a “condition” of 
bail; 2) the associated fees are included as part of that condition; and 3) 
the government interest of preventing drunk driving is legitimate, the 
24/7 Sobriety Program is not “punishment”. Spady argues that Bell does 
not support this conclusion, and, instead, that the accumulation of fees 
over time constitutes a punishment (the fees are non-refundable; 
excessive; and non-regulatory). As Bell noted, “in evaluating the 
constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that 
implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due 
process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those 
conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”27 Both arguments are 
legitimate readings of Bell and it is in the Court’s hands to determine 
whether the fees actually do constitute a punishment.  
 
B. Search & Seizure 
 
The district court found that the 24/7 Sobriety Program testing 
requirements were an unreasonable warrantless, suspicionless search and 
                                           
24 Id. at 14–16. 
25 MONT. CODE ANN. § 44–4–1202(2013) (The quoted provision was present in the 2011 version as 
well.). 
26 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539. 
27 Id. at 535 (emphasis added). 
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therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 




The State argues that the 24/7 Sobriety Program is not an 
impermissible search. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
“reasonableness.”28 Where an individual is already on release from a 
government body, “some reasonable police intrusion on his privacy is to 
be expected” and any intrusion must be reasonable when balancing 
privacy interests and law-enforcement concerns.29 Under Montana law, 
to determine the reasonableness of a search, one must 1) determine if 
there is a subjective expectation of privacy; and 2) ask whether society is 
willing to find it reasonable.30 If both are met, no search has occurred. If 
not met, the third step is to examine whether the state was justified by a 
compelling state interest or justified on other grounds.31 Preventing crime 
by arrestees is a legitimate and compelling government interest.32 In Bell, 
the Supreme Court held that the presumption of innocence doctrine does 
not govern the rights of a pretrial detainee: the doctrine applies at trial 
itself and does not govern rights pretrial.33 In Samson v. California,34 the 
United States Supreme Court held that, because a parolee has diminished 
privacy expectations due to their status, a condition of release which 
allowed police to could conduct warrantless, suspicionless searches was 
valid. Further, the parolee signed the order granting his release from 
prison on these grounds and was unambiguously aware of it.35 In 
Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court upheld DNA swabs of an arrestee, 
arrested on probable cause, because confirming identity, and therefore 
prior crime history, were legitimate and compelling government 
interests. The DNA swab from inside the cheek was associated with no 
pain, trauma, and only determined identity.36 Like Samson, Spady was 
properly arrested and as a condition of his bail required to participate in 
the 24/7 Sobriety Program. His expectation of privacy was diminished. 
Further, like King, preventing repeat DUIs is a compelling government 
interest.37 
                                           
28 Reply Br. of Appellant 5, Dec. 3, 2014, No. DA 14–0089. 
29 Id. at 6 (citing Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969–70 (2013)). 
30 Reply Br. of Appellant 6–7 (citing State v. Allen, 241 P.3d 1045, 1057 (Mont. 2010)). 
31 Id. at 6–7. 
32 Id. at 9. 
33 Reply Br. of Appellant, 14 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 533). 
34 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
35 Id. at 852. 
36 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
37 Reply Br. of Appellant 7–12; Appellant’s Supp. Br. 16–17 (citing Michigan Dept. of State Police 
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990)). 
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Spady agrees with the State’s general conclusion that any search 
must be considered “reasonable.”38 However, Spady largely disagrees 
with the State’s interpretation of case law and cites United States v. 
Scott39 to speak to this. In Scott, the pretrial defendant signed a condition 
of his release on bail which allowed police to conduct warrantless drug 
tests and home searches. The 9th Circuit upheld the suppression of 
evidence discovered during searches of Scott’s home, because the 
searches fell short of “reasonable.”40 The “special needs” doctrine may 
constitutionally justify warrantless searches, however, the needs must be 
separate from a general interest in crime control. While Montana 
recognizes the “special needs” doctrine, the Court has not extended this 
exception beyond probation and parole contexts.41 The primary purpose 
of the 24/7 Sobriety Program might be to reduce drunk driving, but the 
immediate effect is to gain evidence of alcohol consumption so the State 
can impose sanctions. Spady argues this is a general “crime control” 
measure. Further, Spady argues that the State miscites Bell, Samson, and 
King. First, Bell doesn’t hold that pretrial detainees have a reduced 
expectation of privacy, and instead only applies to those confined pretrial 
and therefore only applies to the jail context. Second, King is not a 
pretrial case, it is a booking/arrest case and therefore only applies when 
an individual is being arrested for a felony offense and does not apply to 
the entire pretrial period. In King, the Supreme Court analogized 
fingerprints and DNA and upheld DNA swabs as a legitimate means of 
identification, which is distinguishable from a pretrial alcohol breath 
testing program. Finally, Samson is not a pretrial case, it concerns 
parolees, individuals already convicted of a crime and serving their 
sentence. Therefore, Scott ought to control and the 24/7 Sobriety 





The search and seizure question is the fundamental inquiry in 
this case and the question will come down to which case law is 
controlling. Scott was decided with a scathing dissent by Judge Bybee, 
with seven additional judges dissenting on the denial to hear the case en 
banc by the Ninth Circuit.42 Judge Bybee noted in his dissent that the 
majority’s “conclusion is contrary to history, practice and commonsense; 
it carries monumental implications for the pretrial procedures employed 
                                           
38 Appellee’s Reply Br., 2. 
39 United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 889 (2006). 
40 Br. of Appellee, 16. 
41 Br. of Appellee, 17–18. 
42 Scott, 450 F.3d at 889 (Callahan, J., O’Scannlain, J., Kleinfeld, J., Gould, J., Tallman, J., Bybee, 
J., and Bea, J. dissenting). 
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by every state in our circuit, as well as the United States.”43 And, the 
Sixth Circuit opted to distinguish from Scott in finding that a pretrial 
detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy and the procedure of the 
urine test was reasonable.44 Further, Scott dicta noted the balancing test 
might come out differently if the testing was outside the arrestee’s 
home.45 And, as the State points out, there are many other jurisdictions 
that have allowed pretrial drug testing like the 24/7 Sobriety Program.46 
Scott is distinguishable for several reasons: 1) the searches were 
random, and 2) conducted in the arrestee’s home.47 The 24/7 Sobriety 
Program requires the individual to come to the DOJ and the tests are 
conducted on a regular schedule. Whether the 24/7 Sobriety Program is 
reasonable turns on the Court’s reading of Scott. If Scott is read broadly 
regarding pretrial rights as a general concept and drug testing as a whole, 
the 24/7 Sobriety Program is not permissible. However, if read narrowly, 
the 24/7 Sobriety Program and Scott are factually different. 
Similarly, Bell is also distinguishable depending on the reading. 
Bell was in confinement awaiting trial, not out on bail.48 The State and 
Spady read the case in two different ways: 1) Bell applies to all pretrial 
actions, and therefore all pretrial arrestees, confined or not, are not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment from warrantless, suspicionless 
searches; or 2) Bell only applies to those actually in confinement 
awaiting trial. Once again, depending on the construction given to Bell, 
the outcome could change dramatically. Only the Court can decide if 
Scott is controlling and if Bell applies broadly or not. As such, the Court 




The Court will likely base its decision off of either 1) the pretrial 
punishment or 2) the search and seizure implications of the 24/7 Sobriety 
Program. There is no directly controlling case law for either issue. The 
24/7 Sobriety Program is a successful program for deterring drunk 
driving.49 Although not a justification, it is also very popular and was 
passed by large margins in the Montana Legislature.50 With no clear 
outcome or leaning for either of the decisive issues, and arguably 
legitimate case law to support the 24/7 Sobriety Program, the Court will 
likely choose to keep the program in place.
                                           
43 Scott, 450 F.3d at 875 (Bybee, J. dissenting). 
44 Norris v. Premier Integrity Solutions, 641 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2011). 
45 Br. of Appellee, 16. 
46 Appellant’s Supp. Br. 18. 
47 Scott, 450 F.3d at 865. 
48 Bell, 441 U.S. at 524. 
49 Appellant’s Supp. Br. 1. 
50 Br. of Amicus Curiae Assoc. of Mont. Troopers 5, June 19, 2014, No. DA 14–0089. 
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RECAP: Beach v. State (Beach III); Another Bite at the Apple, but 
Not Quite as Filling   
 
E. Lars Phillips 
 
No. DC11-0723, OP 14-0685 




On February 4th, 2015, the Montana Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in Beach v. State (Beach III). Mr. Beach, charged with 
committing a crime that occurred while he was a juvenile, was convicted 
of deliberate homicide and sentenced to 100 years in prison without the 
possibility of parole.1 The question before the Court was whether 
Beach’s continued incarceration violates the Constitutions of the United 
States or the State of Montana.  
 
II. PETER CAMILLE FOR PETITIONER, BARRY BEACH 
 
Mr. Camille began by characterizing the judicial philosophy at 
the time Beach was sentenced as sentencing judges doling out “adult 
time for adult crime.” He argued that this judicial philosophy was 
inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. 
Alabama,2 which requires a court to consider a defendant’s minority 
status at sentencing. He conceded that the Court had not yet held 
explicitly that Miller was retroactive, but argued that the Court’s 
treatment of Jackson v. Hobbs,3 Miller’s companion case that was 
dismissed on the same day the Miller decision was handed down, had 
implicitly made the Miller rule retroactive.  
Mr. Camille noted that Miller had banned mandatory sentences 
of life without parole for juvenile defendants and issued a mandate to 
courts requiring on-the-record consideration of mitigating factors (such 
as age) when sentencing juvenile defendants. In light of Miller, he 
argued, a sentence of one hundred years without parole was invalid 
because the record did not reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of 
Beach’s age (17) at the time of the crime. Further, Mr. Camille argued 
that, functionally, the sentence at issue amounted to life without parole 
and was therefore invalid under Graham v. Florida4 because the sentence 
left no meaningful opportunity for release as Beach would either die or 
be near the end of his life when released.  
                                           
1 State v. Beach, 705 P.2d 94, 97, 100 (Mont. 1985).  
2 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
3 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).  
4 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
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Allowed the opportunity to address the possibility of re-
sentencing, Mr. Camille argued that, while the court could consider 
Beach’s behavior during his brief episode of freedom following a district 
court’s ruling in 2011, the court should look to all mitigating factors in 
making an individualized determination regarding the appropriate 
sentence. Further, he argued that the Montana Supreme Court’s finding 
of one hundred years without parole to be unconstitutional would provide 
more than enough “new evidence” necessary for the lower court to 
review the sentence. Mr. Camille concluded by noting that it was the 
appellate court’s job to lay out the criteria on which the sentencing court 
should rely and that Miller required, rather than allowed, courts to 
consider mitigating factors before sentencing juvenile defendants. 
 
III. TAMMY PLUBELL FOR RESPONDENT, STATE OF MONTANA 
 
 Ms. Plubell began argument by pointing out that the Petition 
should be dismissed outright as it was procedurally barred by Montana 
Code Annotated § 46–22–101(2). Drawn straight to the heart of 
Petitioner’s argument by Justice Shea, Ms. Plubell conceded there was 
no other reference to Beach’s age at the time of the crime, besides his 
date of birth, in the record.  
 Pressed about whether the sentencing court had taken into 
account mitigating factors or whether Beach should be allowed to take 
advantage of the new science surrounding juvenile defendants, Ms. 
Plubell argued that the sentencing judge had taken all of these issues into 
account because of the very nature of a discretionary sentencing act. 
Further, she noted that the prohibition on mandatory life sentences from 
Graham only applied in non-homicide cases. Ms. Plubell continued by 
arguing that Miller was neither explicitly, nor implicitly, retroactive, and 
Beach should not be allowed to seek relief under those avenues of law. 
Ms. Plubell concluded the State’s argument by noting the toll the 
post-conviction process was taking on the family of the victim in the 
case, and the need for finality in determinations of guilt and innocence.  
 
IV. TERRANCE TOAVS FOR PETITIONER, BARRY BEACH  
 
Mr. Toavs argued briefly and reiterated the two tenets of the 
Petitioner’s argument. First, that the sentence was invalid under Miller as 
the sentencing court had failed to take into account mitigating factors, 
such as the defendant’s age, at the time of sentencing. And second, the 
sentence was invalid as it was the functional equivalent of a life sentence 








Throughout the morning, both Petitioner and Respondent faced 
vigorous questioning from the Court. When the dust settled, there 
appeared to be, at the very least, a question of whether Beach was going 
to receive the relief he seeks. The Court’s decision in Beach III will 
likely hinge on how far the Court is willing to expand the doctrines relied 
upon by the Petitioner. Simply put, in order for Beach to attain relief, the 
Court must promulgate a new rule, providing protections to the juvenile 
defendant above and beyond the existing federal rules in Miller and 
Graham.  
At a minimum, the Court may issue a mandate requiring trial 
courts to note, explicitly, the mitigating factors (e.g. age of the 
defendant) considered when sentencing a juvenile defendant. These 
mitigating factors would, most likely, be extrapolated from the factors 
described in Miller. At maximum, this may expand the application of the 
Miller factors to juvenile defendants in two different ways. First, the U.S. 
Supreme Court only required that the Miller factors be applied to 
mandatory sentencing schemes;5 finding relief under Miller in Beach III 
would expand that mandate to sentences issued under discretionary 
schemes. And second, as the U.S. Supreme Court limited the application 
of Miller to sentences of life without parole,6 applying this rule in Beach 
III would require trial courts to consider the Miller factors for every 
sentence that resulted in a “functional” life sentence (here, one-hundred 
years) without the possibility of parole. 
 Finally, it should be noted that Beach might simply be 
exhausting his claim in state court before seeking federal habeas relief. 
He has based his claims on federal law, and a decision by the Montana 
Supreme Court in Beach III would leave him free to take his claim to the 
federal district courts. Regardless of the final disposition of this case, it is 
safe to say that a few bites of the apple remain for this persistent 
petitioner. 
                                           
5 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
6 Id.  
